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This  paper  uses  Colombian  data  at  the  firm  level  for  the  period  1999  to  2006  to  provide 
microeconomic  evidence  on  the  existence  and  extent  of  downward  nominal  wage  rigidity.  To 
conduct the analysis, we use a rich panel of firms for white and blue collar workers, consisting of 
1517 firms for the former and 781 firms for the latter. The presence of wage rigidity is determined by 
means of three statistic techniques used in recent literature, such as the analysis of the histograms 
of the distribution of wage changes, the LSW statistic and the Kahn test. The results suggest the 
existence of downward nominal wage rigidities; it is worth mentioning that rigidity is higher for blue 
collar workers than white collar workers, since the increase in the wages of the blue workers is 
generally done by taking into account the change in the minimum wage, which is why a higher 
rigidity would be expected. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
During  the  past  two  decades,  the  reduction  of  inflation  and  the  adoption  of  an 
inflation targeting regime have revived the interest in the study of wage rigidities, 
due to the impact they may have on employment. However, this subject continues 
to create controversy in the economics literature. On the one hand, the traditional 
literature (Tobin, 1972, Akerlof, et al 1996; Fortin, 1996) states that when nominal 
wages are downwardly rigid, a certain level of inflation allows for a greater flexibility 
of real wages, since these may be reduced through increases in nominal wages 
that are lower than inflation, thus facilitating adjustments in the labor market. On 
the  other  hand,  Elsby  (2009)  maintains  that  the  macro-economic  effects  of  the 
nominal rigidities of wages are probably small, suggesting that nominal rigidity is 
not a strong argument against the adoption of a low inflation target. 
 
A recent contribution to this debate, which makes use of the greater availability of 
information  on  a  micro-economic  level,  has  been  the  considerable  increase  in 
empirical  studies  of  wage  rigidities.  These  studies  have  employed  information 
based on surveys and dataset at both the firm and worker levels. Blinder and Choi 
(1990),  Campbell  and  Kamlani  (1997),  Bewley  (1999)  and  Agell  and  Lundborg 
(1995, 2003) are some of the authors that use survey data. They  find that the 
reason  why  firms  do  not  reduce  wages  is  that  they  do  not  want  to  affect  the 
motivation, effort and morale of workers, which thus leads to downward nominal 
wage rigidity.  
 
Among  the  studies  that  utilize  datasets  on  both  firms  and  workers,  it  is  worth 
singling out the International Wage Flexibility Project, which analyzes changes in 
individual labor incomes by using 31 data bases from 16 European countries over 
the past three decades. This research project finds evidence of downward rigidities 
both in nominal and real wages, although the degrees and the causes of rigidity 2 
 
vary across different countries that were analyzed.
1 Others examples can be found 
in the November, 2007  issue of the Economic Journal (vol 117, no. 524), whose 
main subject of interest was that of wages rigidity. The articles in this special issue 
journal use a common methodology to estimate the occurrence and scope of both 
real and nominal wage rigidities at the individual level in Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. The studies find that real rigidities are important in these three 
countries, although they have declined over time. They also suggest that rigidities 




Other studies that have used micro-economic information at the level of individuals 
and/or firms in Europe and the United States are those by McLaughlin (1994), 
Kahn (1997), Stiglbauer (2002), Lebow et al (2003), Schweitzer (2007), Brzoza -
Brzezina and Socha (2007), Messina  et al (2008) and Knoppik and Beissinger 
(2009), among others. These studies offer mixed evidence regarding wage rigidity, 
as  they  vary  in  accordance  with  their  respective  methodology  and  source  of 
information. In the Latin American context, the study of wa ge rigidities does not 
appear to have received a great deal of attention. Two exceptions are  Castellanos 
et al (2004) and Cobb and Opazo (2008). The former study analyzes wage rigidity 
in Mexico, utilizing  workers data from the Mexican Institute of Social  Security for 
the period 1985-2001. These authors find   evidence of nominal rigidity, th ough 
there also appears to be evidence  that it has lessened over time. The latter study 
presents micro-economic evidence about the degree of downward wage rigidity in 
Chile, on the basis of the information provided by the wage history of 440,000 
workers during the period from 2001 to 2007. 
 
Recently, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks of the European 
Union formed a research group known as the Eurosystem Wage Dynamic Network 
                                                           
1 A summary of the main results of the Project is found in Dickens et al (2007). 
2 See Goette et al (2007), Bauer et al (2007), Devicienti et al (2007) and Barwell and Schweitzer (2007).  3 
 
whose aim is to study the dynamics of the wages of the region and their policy 
implications.
3 The research team is divided into three areas: a macro group which 
is exploring the dynamics of wages at an aggregate level, a micro group which 
uses information on the level of the individual and/or firm, and a group which is 
conducting an ad hoc survey of the setting of prices and wages at the firm level.
4  
 
Given  the  scarcity  of  studies  of  wage  rigidities  for  developing  countries,  and 
following the lines of the recent research by the European central banks on the 
formation  of  prices  and  wages,  this  paper  aims  to  determine  whether  nominal 
wages in Colombia are downwardly rigid. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first  study  that  provides  micro-economic  evidence  about  the  existence  and  the 
degree of nominal wage rigidity in Colombia. To conduct the analysis, we used a 
dataset  at  the  firm  level  for  white  and  blue  collar  workers,  taken  from  the 
companies which submitted their financial statements to the Superintendencia de 
Sociedades  (Superintendency  of  Corporations)  during  the  period  from  1999  to 
2006. 
 
In particular, the degree of nominal rigidity is determined through the use of some 
statistical techniques employed in the recent literature, such as the analysis of the 
histogram of the distribution of wage changes, the LSW statistic and the Kahn test. 
The results of these alternative approaches suggest the existence of downward 
nominal wage rigidities in Colombia. 
 
This article is divided into three parts, besides this introduction. In the second one 
the data base is described and the main statistics for the variables used in the 
                                                           
3 The preliminary results of the research of these groups which make up this network were presented at the 
“Wage  Dynamics  in  Europe:  Findings  from  the  Wage  Dynamics  Network”  conference,  held  in  Frankfurt, 
Germany,  on  June  24th  and  25th,  2008.  The  presentations  and  the  papers  are  available  on: 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/html/wage_dynamics_network.en.html. 
4  The surveys were carried out by 17 central ba nks (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Spain) between the end of 2007 and the first semester of 2008 and included interviews with more  than 17,000 
firms of different sizes and economic sectors. 4 
 
empirical  analysis  are  presented.  The  third  section  explains  the  tests  for  wage 
rigidities and discusses the results that were obtained. The final section presents 
the main conclusions. 
 
II.  Dataset and descriptive statistics 
 
This paper analyzes data at the firm level which come from the firms that submitted 
financial  statements  to  the  Superintendencia  de  Sociedades  (Supersociedades) 
during the period from 1999 to 2006. The Supersociedades does provide complete 
information about the number of workers and their wages in an important number 
of companies from different sectors of the economy. The study excludes public 
servants and government employees, the self-employed and those who work for 
small-scale companies.  
 
Particularly,  this  study  used  the  information  on  number  of  employees  and  the 
average  wage  by  gender  and  type  of  occupation  (white  collar  and  blue  collar 
workers). Given that the methodology used to determine wage rigidities requires a 
balanced  panel,  it  was  decided  to  include  only  those  firms  that  reported  the 
payment  of  wages  to  workers  with  permanent  contracts  throughout  the  period 
under consideration. The empirical analysis was undertaken with two independent 
samples, one for white collar workers and the other one for blue collar workers, 
which do not necessarily include the same companies.  
 
The sample for white collar workers includes 1,517 firms that reported complete 
information for all the years of the period under analysis. The firms were grouped 
into  7  sectors:  agriculture,  commerce,  construction,  electricity,  gas  and  water, 
manufacturing, financial and other services. As can be seen in Table 1, the number 
of white collar workers is concentrated in the sectors of manufacturing (35.8%) and 
commerce (33.8%). With regard to firm size, 76.8% of the companies are classified 5 
 
as large while the remaining 23.2% are not large.
5 In addition, 81.7% of the firms 
are located in the main four cities of the country; namely 5 1.4% in Bogotá, 15.8% 
in Medellín, 9.6% in Cali and 4.9% in Barranquilla. The remaining 18.3% is located 
in other cities of the country. Regarding blue collar workers, there are 781 firms, of 
which 81.6% are classified as large. These firms are concentrated in the sectors of 
manufacturing (60.2%), agriculture (15.4%) and commerce (14.7%) . Also, about 
44% of the firms are located in Bogotá. 
 
In the 1,517 companies inc luded in the sample of white collar workers , males 
accounted for approximately 54.3% of the work force.  This share is higher in the 
sector of electricity, gas and water (80.6%) and lower in that of financial services 
(37.1%). In the case of  blue collar  workers, the share of males reaches 66.8%, 
surpassing 50% in all of the sectors.  
 
Table 2 shows the average real salaries for the period 1999 -2006 by sector, size, 
location and gender, for both white and blue collar workers. The average monthly 
wage of the white collar workers   included the sample was  US$637.  With the 
exception  of  the  sa laries  observed  in  financial  services,  men´s  wages  were 
significantly higher than those of women. In the case of  blue collar workers, the 
average  real  wage  is  approximately  US$328 .  In  general,  it  is  seen  that,  on 
average, the wage of men is higher than tha t of women by about  16%. These 
differences are larger in the sectors of commerce, construction and manufacturing 
and smaller in agriculture and services. These gender differences in wages confirm 
findings widely documented in the literature on the subject, and although they have 
been reduced on an international level since the 1980´s, they are still present; see, 
e.g., Croson and Gneezy (2009), and the references therein. 
 
                                                           
5 The classification of the firms by size was made by using the criteria established in the Law 590 of 2000. 
Small  (not  large)  firms  are  those  whose  total  assets  are  less  than 15,000 current legal  minimum monthly 
wages (SMMLV, in Spanish initials) while the large firms are those which have total assets higher than 15,000 
SMMLV.  6 
 
It can also be seen that, on average, the wage of white collar workers is twice that 
of blue collar workers. In addition, the electricity, gas and water sector pays, on 
average, the highest wages, followed by the manufacturing sector, while the lowest 
ones are, on average, paid in the agricultural and financial services sectors. In 
terms of company size, the large firms pay, on average, higher wages, than those 
paid  by  firms  that  are  not  large.  For  white  collar  workers  this  amounts  to  a 
difference of 41% on average, while it is 23% for blue collar workers. It is worth 
noting that, in both cases, on average, men receive higher wages than women. 
With regard to the geographical location of the companies in the sample of white 
collar workers, it is seen that the firms located in Bogotá pay, on average, higher 
wages  than  those  in  the  rest  of  the  country.  According  to  the  results  of  the 
statistical significance tests, the wage difference is significant in the case of firms 
located in Cali and Medellin, but not for those in Barranquilla. Furthermore, in all of 
the cities the wages of men significantly surpass those of women. In the case of 
blue  collar  workers,  no  statistically  significant  differences  between  the  average 
wages  in  the  different  cities  are  observed,  suggesting  that  such  wages  are 
homogeneous on a national level. This might be explained by the fact that these 
wages closely follow the level of the national minimum wage. By contrast, gender 
differences are statistically significant in most of the cities in the sample.
6  
 
Finally, it is worth noting to the wide dispersion seen in real wages in the sample of 
white and blue collar workers. In fact, the standard deviation in the wages of white 
collar workers reaches US$426 while that for blue collar workers is US$130, for the 
period being analyzed.
7 In addition, the distribution of the wages by deciles, shown 
in Table 3, indicates that 50% of white collar workers received, on average, a wage 
lower than US$511, and 50% of the  blue collar workers, one lower than US$297. 
                                                           
6 The annual information on wages and the statistical significance tests of the annual difference in wages by 
gender, sector and size, both for white and blue collar workers, were not included for reasons of space, but 
they are available from the authors upon request. 
7 The annual standard deviations of wages by sector, size and location, both for white and blue collar workers, 
are available from the authors upon request. 7 
 
By  contrast,  in  the  highest  decile,  the  wages  of  white  and  blue  collar  workers 
reached, on average, a figure of US$4,056 and US$1,527 respectively. 
 
III.  Wage rigidities 
 
This  section  presents  an  empirical  analysis  of  downward  wage  rigidities  for  a 
sample of Colombian firms. This subject is important, given its possible impact on 
the  persistence  and  volatility  of  inflation,  since  wages  are  one  of  the  main 
components of the marginal cost.  
 
To evaluate wage rigidities, both nominal and real, the recent literature has used 
several statistical tools, including the analysis of the histograms of the distribution 
of  wage  changes  in  a  given  period  of  time.
8  In the presence of  rigidities, the 
distribution is asymmetrical and the data cluster around a reference point. In the 
case  of  n ominal  rigidity,  the  observations  are  clustered  at  zero  and  show 
asymmetry around this point, which is why negative observations near zero are 
less frequent than positive ones. In turn, real rigidity shows increases located to the 
right of the inflation reference. In general, the studies for Europe and the United 
States have found that nominal rigidities are more common when inflation is low, 
whereas real rigidities are more frequent with high inflations.
9 
 
In  the  case  of  Colombia,  Graphs  1  and  2  show  the  distribution  of  the  annual 
changes in nominal wages for white and blue collar workers, respectively, during 
the  period  1999-2006.
10  In the histograms  the bars were given a width of one 
percentage point. The first vertical line on the  left shows the point where the 
                                                           
8 See Kahn (1997), Dickens et al (2007), Goette et al (2007), Bauer et al (2007), Devicienti et al (2007), 
Barwell  and  Schweitzer  (2007),  Schweitzer  (2007),  Brzoza-Brzezina  and  Socha  (2007),  Knoppik  and 
Beissinger (2009), Stiglbauer (2002), Lebow et al (2003), Castellanos et al (2004) and Messina et al (2008). 
9 For example, Schweitzer (2007), Brzoza-Brzezina and Socha (2007), Holden and Wulfsberg (2007 and 2008) 
and Lebow et al (2003). 
10 Extreme salary changes (less than  -15% and more than 35%) were excluded from the construction of the 
histograms, since these changes probably reflect mistakes in reporting or measurement errors. 8 
 
change of the nominal wage is zero and the second line shows the observed rate 
of  inflation  lagged  one  year.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  histograms  show  the 
percentage of firms whose average change in wages was negative. This does not 
necessarily imply that the workers have wage cuts, since the information used in 
this study corresponds to the average wage of the firm and not to the wages of 
individuals. Thus, the average wage of a firm may be affected by changes in the 
composition of  the  work force,  job  rotation  and  the flexibility  of labor contracts, 
which may lead to modifications in the company´s wage structure. Additionally, as 
Akerlof  et  al  (1996)  point  out,  some  of  the  negative  changes  may  be  due  to 




In general, what stands out in the case both of white and blue collar workers is the 
high  variation  in  the  magnitude  of  wage  changes  in  the  same year.  It  is  worth 
noting that most of the wage changes lie in the vicinity of zero and that there is a 
relative small amount of negative wage changes compared to positive increases 
around this point, which would suggest the presence of downward nominal wage 
rigidities. Viewed from another angle, the high cluster of data found around the 
observed  level  of  inflation  might  be  evidence  of  real  rigidity,  which  may  be 
explained  by  the  Colombian  practice  of adjusting  wages,  either in  line  with  the 
inflation of the previous year or with the increase in the minimum wage.
12 
 
Notwithstanding the above, visual inspection of the histograms does not amount in 
itself to a conclusive proof of the existence of downward wage rigidities. For 
example, Stiglbauer (2002) points out that the analysis of the  histograms may be 
                                                           
11 Akerlof et al (1996) point out that some studies present data corrected for measurement errors which affect 
the true distribution of the wage changes, For example, they mention that McLaughlin (1994) shows corrected 
measurements  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  wage  changes,  which  may  be  inappropriate  if  the  true 
distribution is asymmetrical. 
12 During the period under analysis the increase in the minimum wage in Colombia has been higher than the 
observed inflation in the previous year. Sentence C-815 of the Constitutional Court (1999) rules that the setting 
of the minimum wage must take into account the observed level of inflation. 9 
 
sensitive to the choice of the intervals and/or the width of the bars. This author also 
states that it is difficult to determine if a high cluster of observations around zero is 
due to a high proportion of constant nominal wages or small changes in them. For 
these reasons, it is necessary to statistically test the significance of the results 
derived from a visual inspection of the histograms. Towards this end, we employ 
two tests that are frequently applied in the literature.
13 The first is the LSW statistic 
due to Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995), and the  second one is the Kahn 
(1997) test, also known as the Histogram-Location Approach. 
 
The LSW statistic measures the asymmetry generated by the rigidity of wages by 
comparing  the  size  of  the  two  tails  of  the  distribution:  it  takes,  as  a  reference, 
points equidistant from the median. Thus, a symmetrical distribution will tend to 
have an equal number of observations both to the right and the left of the median 
and the LSW statistic will be zero, indicating that there are no rigidities. On the 
other hand, the statistic will be positive if there is a scarcity of negative increments, 
which suggests the presence of nominal wage rigidities. Also, since it is a measure 
of order, the statistic will not be affected by extreme observations.
14 
 
In  line  with  Lebow  et  al  (2003),  this  statistic  is  de fined  as  the  accumulated 
frequency of the distribution of the change in wages which is higher than twice the 
median minus the accumulated frequency of the distribution that is less than zero. 
That is, LSW ≡ [1-F(2*median)]-F(0).
15 
 
The results of the LSW test of asymmetry for white and blue collar workers, along 
with the probability that the null hypothesis would be rejected, are shown in Tables 
                                                           
13 For a presentation of other tests used in the literature, see Lebow et al (2003), Kuroda and Yamamoto 
(2003) and McLaughlin (1994 and 2000).  
14 For more details about the LSW statistic, see Lebow et al (2003) and Castellanos et al (2004). 
15 To calculate the statistical significance of the LSW statistic, we use the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution suggested by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003). The statistic follows a normal distribution, and under 
the null hypothesis of symmetry , where F is the cumulative distribution function,   is 
the change in the nominal wage, 
  is the median of. , and n is the number of observations. 10 
 
4 and 5, respectively. As can be seen, when the calculation of the statistic includes 
information from the whole period, the distribution in the change of the average 
wages  is  positive  and  significantly  asymmetrical,  with  7.5%  and  7.8%  more 
observations on the right tail of the distribution than on the left for white and blue 
collar  workers,  respectively,  which  would  suggest  the  presence  of  downward 
nominal wage rigidities.
16 These results are robust when the statistic is calculated 
for both white and blue collar workers using information for the different years.  
 
The above results fit  within the framework of those reported in the international 
literature. For example, in the case of Australia, Dwyer and Leong (2000)  the 
estimated LSW is 15.8% for the distribution of the wages from a sample of jobs 
between March 1987 and December 1999. Beissinger and Knoppick (2001) find an 
LSW statistic of 4.8% on the basis of the distribution of changes in labor incomes 
from a sample of employees in West Germany for the period 1975-1995. Kuroda 
and Yamamoto find  an LSW statistic of 11% for the distribution of the monthly 
wages of full-time employees in Japan between 1993 and 1998. Lebow et al (2003) 
estimate an LSW of 13.2% for the United States, using information about changes 
in salaries and wages by position in the industry during the period from 1981 to 
1999.  
 
Furthermore,  Table  4  shows  that  79.1%  of  companies,  on  average,  carry  out 
positive changes in nominal wages of white collar workers, while 5.4% of firms do 
not make any changes and 15.5% effect negative changes. In the case of blue 
collar workers these percentages are 81.8%, 7.9% and 10.3%, respectively (Table 
5). These results support the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities. 
 
                                                           
16 Lebow et al (2003) point out that a more robust test about the existence of nominal rigidities should take into 
account the existing relationship between the distribution of wages and inflation. To do this, these authors 
econometrically estimate the relationship between the LSW statistic and inflation, obtaining a negative and 
significant coefficient. In our case, since the analyzed period is short, we calculate the correlation coefficient 
between these two variables, instead of estimating a regression, as Lebow et al (2003) do. In the case of the 
samples of white collar workers, the correlation coefficient is -0.51 and -0.15 for the blue collar workers, which 
supports the evidence for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities. 11 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the LSW statistic could not be robust 
to the underlying asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes. In fact, according 
to  Lebow  et  al  (2003),  if,  independently  of  the  downward  wage  rigidity,  the 
distribution is skewed to the right, then as inflation falls and the distribution moves 
to the left, the statistic may change, even if the shape of the distribution does not. 
 
For the above reason, the Kahn (1997) test was used, which in addition to being 
robust  to  the  presence  of  extreme  observations,  has  the  advantage  of  not 
assuming that the underlying distribution is symmetrical. This test also assumes 
that the shape of the distribution does not change with inflation in the absence of 
downward nominal wage rigidities.
17 
 
This test is based on the histo grams of the distribution of the annual changes of 
nominal wages and compares, for each year, the height of the histogram bars 
which are below zero with those which include changes that are equal to and 
higher than zero, up to the median of the annual change of wages. To carry out the 
test a histogram is constructed for each year, with the width of the bars set at one 
percentage point.
18  On the basis of this information, a system of equations is 
econometrically estimated in accordance with the proportional model suggested by 




                                                           
17 See Lebow et al (2003) and Castellanos et al (2004) for recent applications of this test. 
18 Behr (2006) gives a detailed analysis of the properties of the Kahn (1997) methodology through Monte Carlo 
simulations and finds that this methodology gives an adequate estimate of the parameter of rigidity. However, 
the estimator may possibly be underestimated, if we take into account that the standard errors depend on the 





r indicates a bar of the histogram; 
 
Proprt  denotes  the  proportion  of  the  companies  whose  average  annual  wage 
changes in the year t fall within the range given by: (i) the median of the changes 
minus  r  percentage  points  and  (ii)  the  median  of  the  changes  minus  r+1 
percentage points;  
 
DNEGrt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the change in the 
average nominal wages is less than 0; 
 
D0rt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in the bar which has the 0; 
 
D1rt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in the bar immediately above 
that which has the 0; 
 
D2rt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 two bars above that which has 
the 0; and 
 
DN1rt is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in the bar immediately below 
the one which has the 0. 
 
The parameters to be estimated are  r,  s,  . The model imposes the restriction 
that  s  are  equal  across  equations.  Specifically,  1,  is  the  parameter  which 
measures  the  rigidity  and  detects  when  the  histogram  bar  varies  only  when  it 
contains negative observations. If  1=0, the bar will have the same height in every 
year and there will be no nominal rigidity. If, by contrast,  1 is negative there will be 
evidence of nominal rigidity. The model also imposes the restriction that   is the 13 
 
same  in  all  the  equations.  The  parameter    detects  the  concentration  of 
observations  at  zero  and  2,  3  and  4  measure  the  existence  of  menu  costs, 
ensuring that  1 and   detect the nominal rigidity independently of those costs.  
 
In this exercise twelve equations were estimated, which correspond to the same 
number of histogram bars, since, as in Kahn (1997) the average changes in the 
wages 12% below the median are always negative. This system is estimated by 
using iterative weighted least squares, since the number of years included in the 
sample (7 years) prevents the SUR estimation done by Kahn (1997).
19 In addition, 
in line with Lebow et al (2003) and Brzoza-Brzezina and Socha (2007), a logistic 
transformation is used in each equat ion, since the estimated dependent variable 
(the height of the histogram bar) cannot be negative.
20. 
 
The results of the Kahn test are shown in T ables 6 and 7 for the sample of  white 
and blue collar workers, respectively. The coefficient of the DNEG variable, which, 
as  was  said,  indicates  the  presence  of  downward  nominal  wage  rigidities  is 
negative and significant in both cases. Specifically, in the sample of white collar 
workers, this coefficient ( 1) would imply that the negative changes in the wages 
are close to 17.5% less than what would be expected in the absence of wage 
rigidities.
21 In the case of the workers this coefficient is higher than that of the white 
collar workers  ( 1=29%),  which  is consistent  with  the fact  that  the  wage  of  the 
workers is closely linked to the performance of the minimum wage, which is why 
one would expect a greater nominal downward wage rigidity.  
 
It is worth noting that the magnitude of these results might be affected by reporting 
errors in the wages and by the fact that in this exercise the unit of analysis is the 
                                                           
19 Beissinger and Knoppik (2001) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) also use iteratively reweighted least 
squares to avoid unstable results resulting from the relatively short period of their sample. 
20 This is:  . 
21 That is, the height of the histogram bars which contain negative changes would fall by 17.5% with respect to 
a scenario without wage rigidities. 14 
 
average wage of the firms and not the individual wage. A similar result was found 
by  Brzoza-Brzezina  and  Socha  (2007)  who  estimate  downward  nominal  wage 
rigidities at the firm level in Poland. These authors argue that such rigidity is less 
than the one calculated on the basis of individual worker data, since in the first 
case information about the average wage is used. As a consequence, it is not clear 
whether the indicator for rigidity obtained at the firm level is the result of a greater 
flexibility of wages or changes in the composition of the work force within each firm. 
Thus,  as  in  the  Polish  case,  the  coefficient  of  rigidity  that  is  obtained  must  be 
regarded as a lower limit of the true downward nominal rigidity. 
 
The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  variable  D0  indicates  that  the  bars  of  the 
histograms which include changes in wages equal to zero are  larger than they 
would be in the absence of long-term contracts or reasons other than the rigidity of 
wages or menu costs. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables that were 
included  to  detect  the  presence  of  menu  costs,  namely  D1,  D2  and  DN1,  are 
positive  but  only  D1  and  D2  are  statistically  significant.  This  suggests  that  the 
menu costs are not important in the case of the sample under analysis and for that 
reason the average increases of the wages of the firms, although positive, may be 
less than 1 and 2%, respectively. These results are different from those estimated 
by Kahn (1997) and Lebow et al (2003), who find that the coefficients of these 
variables are negative. The difference may be due to the fact that, in this case, 
changes in the average nominal wage of the companies are analyzed instead of 
that of individuals, which might increase the number of changes in wages close to 
zero. 
 
It should be mentioned that the coefficient of rigidity ( 1) estimated in this study lies 
in  the  lower  range  of  those  reported  by  the  international  studies  (Table  8). 
However, these comparisons must be interpreted with caution, since the unit of 
analysis  (that  is  individual,  job  or  firm),  the  measurement  of  remuneration,  the 15 
 
period under consideration and the labor legislation widely differ from one country 
to another. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
This study provides micro-economic evidence about the existence and degree of 
downward nominal wage rigidity for a sample of Colombian firms during the period 
1999- 2006. In particular, from the analysis of the histograms of the distribution of 
the annual changes in nominal wages it is found that there is a high variation in its 
magnitude, both for white and blue collar workers. 
 
It is worth emphasizing the cluster of wage variations around zero as well as the 
existence of more positive than negative wage changes, suggesting the presence 
of downward nominal wage rigidities. Furthermore, the higher cluster of data found 
around  the  observed  inflation,  could  be  the  consequence  of  the  common 
Colombian practice of adjusting wages on the basis of inflation or the increase of 
the minimum wage. 
 
To statistically test the significance of the results derived from the visual inspection 
of the histograms, two tests frequently applied in the literature on wage rigidities 
were used: the LSW statistic and the Kahn test. The results of these tests confirm 
the existence of downward nominal wage rigidities in the analyzed samples. 
 
It is worth noting, in addition, that on the basis of the results of the Kahn tests, we 
find that the coefficient of rigidity is higher for blue collar workers than white collar 
workers, since the increase in the wages of the blue collar workers is generally 
done by taking into account the change in the minimum wage, which is why a 
higher rigidity would be expected. 
 16 
 
The coefficients of rigidity estimated in this paper lie in the lower range of those 
reported by international studies, which may be due to the fact that the analysis 
was made on the level of the firm and not the individual. As a consequence, the 
indicator  for  rigidity  may  be  affected  by  changes  in  the  composition  of  the 
workforce within each firm. 
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Table 1 
Sample statistics: 1999-2006  
Firms by sector 
Sector 
White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Firms 
Share of the 
total (%)  Firms 
Share of the 
total (%) 
Agriculture  148                 9.8   120  15.4 
Commerce  513               33.8   115  14.7 
Construction  99                 6.5   37  4.7 
Electricity, gas and 
water  29                 1.9   7  0.9 
Manufactures  543               35.8   470  60.2 
Financial services  53                 3.5   10  1.3 
Other services   132                 8.7   22  2.8 
Firms by size 
Size 
White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Firms 
Share of the 
total (%)  Firms 
Share of the 
total (%) 
Large   1,165  76.8  637  81.6 
Not large   352  23.2  144  18.4 
Firms by location 
City 
White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Firms 
Share of the 
total (%)  Firms 
Share of the 
total (%) 
Bogotá   780  51.4  344  44.0 
Cali   145  9.6  59  7.6 
Medellín   239  15.8  84  10.8 
Barranquilla  75  4.9  34  4.4 
Other cities  278  18.3  260  33.3 
Total sample  1,517  100  781  100 










Average real wage 1999-2006 (US$) 
Real wage by sector: average 1999-2006 
  White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Male  Female  Weighted  Male  Female  Weighted 
Agriculture 
  559.4  475.8  522.6  257.6  245.8  256.6 
Commerce 
  628.6  519.2  582.7  320.6  269.1  315.5 
Construction 
  627.3  477.1  558.2  310.2  265.1  308.6 
Electricity, gas 
and water  1578.1  977.8  1418.1  700.6  642.6  700.5 
Manufactures 
  769.7  603.5  696.6  359.8  305.9  348.6 
Financial 
services  470.5  470.6  466.6  292.5  246.0  282.4 
Other services 
  749.9  605.9  688.7  300.6  271.6  296.8 
Real wages by size: average 1999-2006 
  White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Male  Female  Weighted  Male  Female  Weighted 
Large  
  748.1  594.4  682.7  348  298.6  339.7 
Not large  
  521.2  432.9  486.5  283.1  238.0  276.6 
Real wages by location: average 1999-2006 
  White collar workers  Blue collar workers 
Male  Female  Weighted  Male  Female  Weighted 
Bogotá   761.9  604.6  695.0  334.1  278.6  325.1 
Cali   659.3  544.4  600.8  317.1  295.8  310.1 
Medellín   685.1  551.1  625.4  342.2  306.0  333.3 
Barranquilla  734.4  523.0  666.6  343.1  276.9  334.6 
Other cities  526.9  445.0  496.0  339.9  298.3  333.6 
Total sample  695.8  557.2  637.2  336.0  288.8  328.1 
Source: Supersociedades and authors’ calculations. 





 Distribution of real wages by deciles: 
Average 1999-2006 (US$) 




1  292  209 
2  348  231 
3  401  253 
4  453  275 
5  511  297 
6  585  324 
7  682  354 
8  834  395 
9  1,115  475 
10  4,056  1,527 
Source: Supersociedades and authors’ calculations 
Note: Annual wages were converted into American dollars using the 
average exchange rate of each year.  
 
Table 4 












Percentage changes in nominal 
wages  
      Positive   Equal 
to zero 
Negative 
2000  6.841  0.0000  81.3  6.1  12.6 
2001  3.686  0.0137  79.4  4.5  16.1 
2002  6.390  0.0001  78.6  5.8  17.5 
2003  7.454  0.0000  79.6  5.0  15.4 
2004  9.453  0.0000  79.8  5.6  14.6 
2005  6.357  0.0002  77.6  4.5  17.9 
2006  7.926  0.0000  77.4  6.5  16.1 
All years  7.448  0.0000  79.1  5.4  15.5 



















Percentage changes in nominal 
wages  
      Positive   Equal 
to zero 
Negative 
2000  8.242  0.0000  82.8  8.3  8.9 
2001  5.467  0.0021  83.2  7.5  9.3 
2002  5.505  0.0020  82.6  7.1  10.3 
2003  5.172  0.0056  80.0  8.5  11.5 
2004  7.806  0.0000  82.9  7.3  9.8 
2005  9.274  0.0000  80.6  8.2  11.2 
2006  5.937  0.0020  80.1  9.0  10.9 
All years  7.807  0.0000  81.8  7.9  10.3 

























Kahn test for nominal wage rigidities: 
White collar workers 1999-2006 
 








































Number of observations: 84 (r=12, t=7) 















Kahn test for nominal wage rigidities:  
Blue collar workers 1999-2006 
 








































Number of observations: 84 (r=12, t=7) 





















Kahn (1997) test: International evidence 
Paper  Sources of information  Country/period  1   
Kahn (1997) 
Wage earners 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) 
United States 
1970-1988  -0.47  4.43 
Dwyer and 
Leong (2000) 
Prevailing market rates of pay 
for specific job descriptions 
Mercer Cullen Egan Dell 
Survey 
Australia 




Blue collar workers 
IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe 
(Social security information) 
Germany 
1975-1995  -0.09   
White collar workers 
IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe 
(Social security information) 
Germany 
1975-1995  -0.17   
Lebow et al 
(2003) 
Specific job categories in the 
private nonfarm sector  
Employment Cost Index (ECI) 
United States 













Wages at the firm level 
Central Statistical Office Forms-
Corporate Financial Reports 
Poland 




British New Earnings Surveys 
United Kingdom 






Household Panel (ECHP) 
 










































Histograms of the distribution of annual changes in average nominal wages of the 
firms: White collar workers 1999-2006 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   
   
   






























































































































































Histograms of the distribution of annual changes in average nominal wages of the 
firms: blue collar workers 1999-2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   
   
   






















































































































































Wage changes: blue collar workers 2006/2005
Inflation(t-1)